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A Two Stage Investigation of the Determinants of
Information Systems Outsourcing
K. Nam*, S. Rajagopalan*, H.R. Rao*, and A. Chaudhury!
* State University of New York at Buffalo
! University of Massachusetts, Boston
Outsourcing has recently emerged as a key method of managing Information Systems
especially since the report about Eastman Kodak and IBM's outsourcing partnership in
1989 (Loh and Venkatraman, 1992a, 1992b). The importance of outsourcing is partially
illustrated by the fact that there are myriad conflicting arguments both for and against
outsourcing (Chaudhury et al, 1989, 1995; Gantz, 1990; Lacity and Hirschheim, 1993;
Nam et al, 1995a, 1995b).
Most outsourcing studies have focused on the investigation of the determinants of the
decision to outsource by clients. Transaction cost economics (TCE) theory has recently
been used in the study of the determinants of outsourcing (Lacity and Hirschheim, 1993;
Nam et al, 1995a, 1995b). The theory of transaction cost economics (TCE) was originally
formulated to address the "make" versus "buy" choice (Anderson and Coughlan, 1987;
Erramilli and Rao, 1993)
In TCE, Williamson (1989, 1987, 1981, 1979) proposed that firms should insource when
they expect opportunistic behavior by the vendors. In particular when clients are lockedin with vendors, vendors' opportunistic behavior will significantly impair the clients'
interests. This statement implies that attributes of existing relationships such as
opportunism affect the firms' subsequent "make-or-buy" decision with the incumbent
vendors. However, most prior empirical research on TCE has treated each sourcing
decision as an independent event (Masten, 1984; Walker and Walker, 1987, 1984)
thereby disregarding the prior relationships that affect the subsequent sourcing decisions.
Therefore, any outsourcing study must explicitly incorporate the role of prior ties in its
analytical framework (Gulati, 1995).
In the outsourcing context, it has been reported that very often clients continue their
relationships with vendors. Also, many firms have to decide whether they should
continue the outsourcing relationships with the vendors or not. Factors that affect
continuation of the relationships are different from factors that affect the initial
outsourcing behavior because client firms have locked-in relationships with vendors.
According to Seabright et al (1992), and Levinthal et al (1988), prior relationships need
to be investigated in order to study the subsequent relationships between clients and
vendors. This study will focus on i) the determinants of the outsourcing decisions and ii)
the tendency to persist in the locked-in outsourcing relationship.
We investigate the factors that determine outsourcing decisions in two stages. In the first
stage, both insourcing and outsourcing firms are studied to investigate the determinants

of "make-or-buy" decision. In the second stage, only outsourcing firms are considered in
order to study the intention to continue with the relationship.
Two dimensions are proposed in order to conceptualize the diverse types of outsourcing
between clients and vendors (Nam et al, 1994a, 1994b). The first dimension is the extent
of substitution by IS vendors and the second dimension is the strategic impact of IS
applications. There are two types of strategic impact of IS applications: differentiation
and cost reduction. The first dimension is proposed from the IS vendors' point of view
while the second dimension is proposed from the client firms' point of view. Based on
these two dimensions, four types of outsourcing relationships are proposed. These four
types are support, reliance, alignment, and alliance.
The support cell has a low extent of substitution and low strategic impact. This cell
corresponds to the traditional IS vendors service. Vendors are usually restricted to noncore IS activities and the size of contract is small. The reliance cell has a high extent of
substitution and low strategic impact. The IBM and Kodak outsourcing example
corresponds to this cell. In recent years, the trend of outsourcing has moved from the
support cell to the reliance cell. The alignment cell has a low extent of substitution and
high strategic impact. Examples in this cell are mostly IS consulting types of services.
Even though vendors are not significantly involved with client firms' IS operations, IS
vendors significantly influence clients' IS operations. The alliance cell has a high extent
of substitution and high strategic impact. Outside vendors not only substitute in-house IS
operations but also contribute to clients' competitive advantages through provision of
important IS functional activities.
In the first stage, hypotheses are developed based on transaction and non-transaction cost
factors with respect to the two proposed outsourcing dimensions. Three transaction cost
factors are studied as determinants of the two dimensions: asset specificity, uncertainty,
potential number of vendors. Four non-transaction cost factors are also investigated.
These four non-TCE factors are IT competency, IS influence, heterogeneity of
information systems, and decision analysis effort. Multiple regressions are used to test
hypotheses in the first stage.
In the second stage, hypotheses are proposed based on prior relationships between clients
and vendors in order to study the determinants of the intention to continue with the
outsourcing relationships. Prior relationships are represented by the four types of
outsourcing relationships based on two dimensions of outsourcing, vendors performance
in terms of client satisfaction, vendors' opportunistic behavior and the length of prior
relationships. Logistic regression is employed to test hypotheses in the second stage.
Questionnaires were developed based on interviews with IS manager and pretested.
Following a pretest, 800 questionnaires were sent to senior IS managers in the U.S. A
follow-up letter was mailed to those who had not responded after about three weeks.
In total 154 usable questionnaires were received representing a response rate of 19.25%.
Out of 154, 93 responded as outsourcing firms and 61 responded as insourcing firms.

Results
In the first stage the results indicate that asset specificity, IT competency, and decision
analysis effort have positive impact on the differentiation aspect of the strategic impact of
IS applications. However, when the focus is on cost reduction, none of the three factor is
significant. For the extent of substitution, uncertainty has a negative impact,
heterogeneity of IS systems has a positive impact, IT competency has a negative impact,
size of firm has a positive impact. Results are summarized in Table 1.
For the second stage, three dummy variables are employed in order to compare the
intention to continue with the relationship in the four cells. The results indicate that
outsourcing relationships in the reliance and alignment cells are more likely to persist
compared with relationships in the support cell. However, outsourcing relationships in
the alliance cell are not likely to persist compared to relationships in other cells. Clients'
satisfaction has a positive impact and vendors' opportunistic behavior has a negative
impact on the persistence of the relationships. The duration of prior relationships do not
affect the persistence of relationships between vendors and clients. Results are
summarized in Table 2.
Discussion
In the first stage, the results (see Table 1) indicate that only one TCE factor, uncertainty,
is significant while other two factors, asset specificity, and potential number of vendors,
are not significant. These results are not consistent with the theory of TCE. The most
possible reason deals with the nature of TCE. Gulati(1995) argued that there are two
types of governance structures: equity and nonequity ownership. Nonequity ownership
does not involve the sharing or exchange of equity, nor does it entail the creation of a
new organizational entity. In contrast, equity based ownership requires a capital
commitment from both parties or one party, and the transaction cost factors are signified
by the capital commitment. Thereby, application of TCE to outsourcing may not be as
satisfactory as application to other equity-type governance modes unless it requires
equity ownership. If outsourcing practices are more equity-based, more consistent results
would be obtained.
In the first stage, IT competency and heterogeneity of information systems are more
significant factors than uncertainty and size of firms. IT competency and heterogeneity of
information systems are systems-related factors, while uncertainty is an environmentrelated factor and size of firms is an organization-related factor. It is inferred that even
though environmental and organizational factors affect the decision of outsourcing, major
determinants of outsourcing are systems-related.
There are several important findings in the second stage with respect to four cells. The
first finding is concerned with the two types of strategic impact, cost reduction and
differentiation. Regardless of whether outsourcing vendors are involved in cost reduction
functions or differentiation functions, same factors affect the persistence of relationships.

The second finding is relevant to the current trend of outsourcing. The trend of
outsourcing relationships is a movement from the support cell to the reliance cell or
alignment cell.
The third finding is with regard to the future trend of outsourcing. One of the most
interesting issues in outsourcing is whether outsourcing for strategic functions is a good
practice or not. This question is equivalent to asking whether the alliance cell is a good
and viable option for client firms to be in. The study indicates that outsourcing
relationships tend to persist when either the strategic impact of outsourced IS activities or
the extent of substitution by vendors is high. It implies that outsourcing vendors are
successful in reliance and alignment cells regardless of whether IS applications are for
cost reduction or differentiation. However, when both
Table 1. Hypotheses Testing in the First Stage
Determinants

Dependent

Variables

ST_IMP_Diff ST_IMP_Cost Ext_Sub
Asset Specificity
Uncertainty
Potential Vendors
IT Competency
IS Influence
Heterogeneity
Experience
Size
Decision Effort

+(***)
N/A
N/A
+(***)
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
+(*)

.
N/A
N/A
.
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
.

.
-(**)
.
-(***)
.
+(***)
.
+(**)
N/A

R Square
F Value
Prob>F

0.2667
18.185
0.001

0.0308
3.026
0.0314

0.1091
2.221
0.0291

Level of Significance: *** for p=0.01, ** for p=0.05, and * for p=0.1
Size = LOG (Sales)
the strategic impact and the extent of substitution by vendors are high, there is no
evidence of a tendency to persist in the relationship. It implies that current practice of
outsourcing for the alliance cell is not stable enough for existing relationships to persist.
Hence, the factors that affect the persistence of relationships in the alliance cell should be
further investigated.
The fourth finding provides interesting implications for IS vendors. In this study,
vendors' performance was represented by two factors: opportunistic behavior and
satisfaction with vendors. Satisfaction with vendors was operationalized in terms of
vendors' technical competency. A further investigation of the chi-square values for each
variable from individual logistic regression indicates that both factors are almost equally

important in determining the persistence of existing relationships. This implies that IS
vendors should be sound in terms of technical competency and relationships.
The fifth finding is concerned with duration. The result indicates that duration of prior
relationships has no effect on the persistence of outsourcing relationships. According to
TCE, duration is one of important factors that affect the types of contract as well as future
relationships between vendors and clients. However, it is found that long-term prior
relationships do not guarantee the persistence of outsourcing relationships at all.
This study contributes in three ways: First, transaction cost economic theory is enhanced
with the non-TCE factors and is used to investigate two
Table 2. Hypotheses Testing in the Second Stage
•
•
•

Out of 93 outsourcing firms, 15 firms who do not have a specific plan were
dropped from the analysis. Therefore, 78 firms were used for analysis.
78 firms were categorized into four cells by median values of each dimension.
Since the dimension of strategic impact is operationalized in two ways, the
samples are categorized in two ways. The first column shows the result for
strategic differentiation and the second column is for cost reduction.
Determinants

ST_IMP_Diff ST_IMP_Cost

DUMMY (Alignment)
DUMMY (Reliance)
DUMMY (Alliance)
Satisfaction
Opportunism
Duration

+(**)
+(**)
.
+(**)
-(**)
.

+(**)
+(*)
.
+(**)
-(*)
.

Chi-Square

24.258

23.331

Level of Significance: *** for p=0.01, ** for p=0.05, and * for p=0.1
dimensions. Second, diverse outsourcing relationships are conceptualized by two
dimensions and four types of outsourcing relationships. Third, it investigates the
tendency to continue with existing relationships.
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